

Philm | aporia: depopulation and antinatalism | two documentaries

To be or not to be...

– Shakespeare, *Hamlet*



From *Aporia*, 2023 film by Jared Moshe

In philosophy, in logic, an *aporia* is a puzzle, a form of paradox, a problem arising when two claims on our attention, each as evident as the other, counter each other leaving us at a loss as to what to think. In ethics, it is a situation that leaves us at a loss as to what to feel or do. The two film documentaries below appear to present an ethical dilemma. We have addressed the topics of depopulation and antinatalism in the past [here](#), [here](#), and [here](#), but this event will be a discussion of two engaging, well-made films motivated by seemingly opposed concerns – which is the greater? *Where we choose to target our compassion is unclear.*

1. Birthgap - Childless World PART 1

By Stephen J. Shaw

<https://youtu.be/A6s8QlIGanA?si=Ym6nrI43ow2RZx1s>

“The era of ultra-low birthrates has begun. But why are people having so few children these days? And what are the consequences? Come on a journey of discovery across 24 countries to find the reason and also the future consequences for young and old alike.” [Recent Q&A by Shaw.](#)

2. I Wish You Were Never Born - A Documentary

By Jack Boswell

<https://youtu.be/tnjC4GCHvA8?si=RP4xYn2jSXP-VmXY>

“Life is a gift, isn't it? Or perhaps it's actually pretty awful? In this documentary, I explore the fringe philosophy of Antinatalism: the belief that having children is morally wrong because life contains mostly suffering.

“How has the movement spread and found new followers? What impact does it have on antinatalists' lives for them to hold such an extreme belief? How does it cross over with issues including climate change, abortion rights, mental health and assisted suicide? Join me, as I travel from London to the far-flung corners of America to find out.

“When all is said and done, is the kindest thing you can do for someone... not bring them into existence in the first place?”

...

I want to focus our discussion on the moral/existential aspects of the dilemma, or perhaps trilemma, of the problem, not the political. Though, as the NYT article below shows, the problem invites political opportunists... By “trilemma,” I mean there are traumatic consequences for policies *no matter* whether they are pronatalist, antinatalist, or whatever vision of a sustainable population equilibrium one might entertain. If you think there's a way out, let's talk.

Let's try being reasonable...

In “[Antipronatalism](#),” at his blog *Field Guide to the Anthropocene*, Jason Anthony proposes a view intermediate between pronatalism and antinatalism that may appeal to some with moderate inclinations on the depopulation question. He imagines a sustainable, if small, future population more integrated with the environment on *this* planet than its current inhabitants... Leaving aside the politics in which he wraps his argument, is his modest vision of what should become of the human species realistic? Is this the way out? How likely are we to realize something like what he describes?

He is right to point to the one-dimensional capitalist interest in raising the depopulation alarm, but wrong, I think, in not fully thinking through the likelihood of his proposal and the consequences, should it, against all odds, come to pass. An annotated copy of his article with my critique is [here](#).

But apart from its probability, how conceptually coherent is Anthony's view? It seems a reasonable proposal like his runs afoul of the *non-identity problem*?¹ A conceptual problem, seldom faced, when people talk of a *better* world because it has *better* people in it, is the *discontinuity* between us in *this* world and people in *that* world. If some future world is better for people – or beings or entities –

1. A problem owing to philosopher Derek Parfit. See Molly Gardner's quick [presentation of the problem](#).

fundamentally *different* from us, *how can we span the difference with genuine empathy?* If we think we can, what are the limits to our empathetic imagination? There are limits, aren't there?

Either there are or there are not. Let's see.

Suppose there are, what are they? How far out into the future, across how much difference, can we remain non-hypocritically² concerned about the beings – or, more cautiously, *things or entities* – in whose causal history we factor chronologically but with whom we share only the thinnest identity? How much of this identity is real, how much motivated? To take an extreme example (I think), can I convincingly say I am immortal because the elements that comprise my physical body are not going out of existence when I die and my body is decomposed. The compost, ashes, gasses or fluids that formerly comprised my body will *still* be part of the same material world I inhabited when I was alive. If I choose to identify with these residues, then I am immortal. I am going nowhere when I die. I will merely change form, my molecules recombine into different compounds, but remain every bit as much a part of the natural world as before my decomposition.

Some will take this view literally. I wager these are few, however. Most of us will say, with Locke or his more religious predecessors, that there is something *essential* in what we are, here and now, *while alive*, that vanishes when we die. (Locke thought it was memory or the possible content of your consciousness.) What survives my death is *not* me. *Not being me, it cannot be my concern.*

But, certainly, I can be concerned about what becomes of those with whom, while alive, I empathized with: those who will survive me who were important to me. But why were they important to me? Because I *shared* something essential with them. What permitted this sharing, this affinity? Something about them *I could identify with*: blood, friendship, at least acquaintance, some quality or aspect of them recognizable to me, to which I may attach a fellow-feeling. This allows me to say they, in some sense, are or were a part of me. Their well-being matters to me because of what *in them* I can identify with. But what if these who (or what) survive me become too different from anything I can identify with? What if they change so much that it is as though they become almost a different species of being? Surely, we may still identify with the fate and well-being of other species, even other life forms, maybe even states of the inanimate world? But there are typically limits to this. Empathy (at least the human sort) attenuates across time, space, and change.

Did your great great grandparents spend as much as five minutes of their lives thinking of the very specific being you would become? Their children, of course. Grandchildren, probably. Great grandchildren maybe a little less, beyond that? beyond any descendants they can imagine better than they could imagine their evolutionary ancestors, the ones wandering out of Africa? This is a problem looking both forward and backward temporally. Do you lose sleep at night over the great suffering many of your ancestors endured even just to have the privilege of being your ancestors? Do you have any idea how great that suffering must have been? Do you care? Or, like most of us, have you evolved a blessed capacity for forgetting? Similarly we evolved wonderful capacities to remain practically indifferent to the suffering we are making possible every moment we prolong our existence, especially

2. We may *mouth* concern, but make no effort to alter our lives reflecting the concern.

by encouraging the procreation of more like us, more who we will, happily or negligently, grant the privilege of experiencing decay and death... Or?

Or maybe we have faith that they, or their descendants, will one day conquer suffering and death? (Logic permits the possibility, even if history is more chary.) How? By preventing or becoming invulnerable to negative experiences.³ But then what similarity will be preserved between us and them, what can we latch onto sufficiently to say: “Good, these future beings – or things – in whose causal history I figure *matter to me, still*”? These future beings or things who will be so different from me, who will have experiences so different from any I may imagine... with whom, I am invited to believe, I can *still* sufficiently identify and in whose existence and survival I will still find a measure of consolation.

If I can stretch my empathetic imagination thus far, then... just a little farther and I may attain oneness with the elements on the periodic table. And, in this way, I achieve immortality...

I must be extremely selfish, empathetically parochial, because I have trouble with this stretch...

The paradox of empathy is that, while it reaches out, it is intrinsically selective. We focus on this one, these few, while the others...? It is sheepishly self-centered. But it is the best we can do. Only *mentally* can we imagine doing more. Mentally we can imagine a lot. Conveniently. But empathy is not an idea. It is an affect. It is picky and it comes and goes.

The true meaning of “wishful thinking”

Anthony’s vision of people in some possible world acting as we have never acted, who, nevertheless, *can identify with us*, seems implausible to the point of inconceivable. Here is why: because the picture he draws presupposes these future people are, at once, continuous with the kind of people we are today, sufficiently so that we may identify with them – that is, they have a memory of being like us, we envision them a kind of future version of ourselves – while, at the same time, they are pictured *by us* as behaving as we may imagine an earlier people from a past from which we evolved, people earlier in our causal history, who did not have an inkling of what we would know or would be like today. If at some point we want to say our ancestors lived in *harmony with nature*, this judgment is *ours*, in hindsight. *They* were not doing what *we* imagine them to have done. They were *not* consciously living in harmony with nature. When we picture them living that way it is *ex post facto* imagining things. *They*, these we imagine as our precursors, never lived in harmony with nature – except in our rear-view mirror, as it were. We are picturing them that way, knowing what we do *now*, valuing what we do *now*. They just lived as they did: innocent of our retroactive valuations. Hence, *we* never lived in harmony with nature, *they* did, but only because we paint them into such a picture. They just lived. As we do now, as those future people in whose causal history we figure will one day judge us to have lived. They will judge us however they will, just as we pass judgment on our ancestors – to the extent we do. The judgment of those future people is not up to us. In judging ourselves out of step with a sustainable salutary way of living, for example, *now*, this is *our* assessment.

3. As suggested by [transhumanism](#).

The assessment is not, via this argument, anyway, an incorrect judgment. It is, indeed, true of us *now* that this is how we may see ourselves. When we pretend to assess future people, however, we are expressing our feelings about ourselves *now*, projecting them onto these future non-existing people. If one day there exist people – causally related to us because we are their biological ancestors – that behave as Anthony describes, better adjusted to the planet they live on than we, what will warrant our asserting an identity with them enough to say we owe them consideration? The very fact they will behave differently, by hypothesis, in such a fundamental way, from us or from any past people causally related to them *breaks* the warrant for an ascription of identity. Breaking that connection, makes it wholly a matter of how much we want to imagine ourselves caring one way or another what they do.

Can moral responsibility press so hard on the boundaries of our imaginative capacity? Perhaps it can. But that leads to another problem... Where will it stop? There is no principled way to stop it. We are led back to the immortality/extinction⁴ conclusion. If there is no reigning in moral responsibility... the elements on the periodic table will eventually garner our regard. Perhaps rightly so. This may be taken as a *reductio ad absurdum*. But, just as well, it may warrant a *modus ponens*, an inference to the conclusion that morality will undo itself by ceasing to apply to living things because it will enjoin their extinction. Moral concern becomes a self-limiting disease. Perhaps we can imagine this already... Harm will, one day soon, *cease* to be done because those sensitive to it will have *excused* themselves as targets – that is to say, from existence.

But we *do* value the “afterlife”: the life of beings that will survive us...

Relevant is [this discussion](#) by David Egan on Samuel Scheffler’s contention in *Death and the Afterlife* that, while we are psychological egoists⁵ in the sense that we think first of our own self-interest, experiences which we can *never* have (because they may be had only by others) *also* tug at our normative concern. These can extend to events *before* and *after* any we can possibly experience.

Scheffler’s thought experiment: Suppose the world were to end six months *after* your death, would this matter to you? Why should climate change or depopulation or radical human transformation, *the full effect of which you will not live to see*, be a concern (to the extent it is at all) for you? If it is, then the range of your empathetic imagination is not limited to the span of your time here breathing. That said, the range of your capacity for empathy is still limited – and *unprincipled* in being so. It seems arbitrary, and that leaves it, while humanly understandable, lacking in rational foundation.⁶ Why do you care about the experiences of future “people” *this* far out into the future or past but not *that* far out? How much of our time here have we devoted to thinking of the well-being of ancestors or descendants three generations back or forward? (Or, in my case, because I don’t have offspring, the descendants of family or friends whom I will never know?)

4. A too generous empathetic imagination leads to identification with the inanimate.

5. To be distinguished from *egotism*, *willful* selfishness or self-centeredness. Psychological egoism is a matter of *evolved* constitution.

6. Unless we collapse the significance of “humanly understandable” and “rationally defensible,” but how conveniently anthropocentric...

This leaves us always wondering whether we are not just making up justifications for decisions we have already made or have been made for us – maybe to help us sleep better. This looks a lot like *rationalization* – not what philosophers sometimes call “reason-responsiveness,” susceptibility to a conclusion because we have thought things through as far as our capacity to think can take us. At least animals do not gesture at justification for why they behave as they do. *Why must we?* Our capacities to *remember*, *anticipate*, and *imagine* press hard on the outer boundaries of our ethical concern. But these capacities are finite. Do we have a duty to keep pressing on them, keep pushing them further and further out, to unbridle our awareness?⁷

If so, how far? If not, why not?

Pure moral logic *cannot condone* a limit to the expansion of moral concern, while the exigencies of life *enforce* forgetfulness of the past and self-deception about the future. In this tug of war, life has usually won. Will it always?

It will until it won’t. Are we beginning to imagine *that* point in our moral development? The point where life can see nothing but darkness at the end of the tunnel? Where our rationalizations for being here begin to seem lame? But if we persist, it will be only because we fall back on being fauna, as innocent as the dinosaurs on their fateful day. Is that moral regression? Is that even possible?⁸



You only die when you are forgotten.

There's a million times more dead than living and the dead are dead a million times longer than the living are alive...

– Flannery O'Connor, *The Violent Bear it Away*

Life wins... our being here is proof

In their long video essay, “[Should People Exist? Antinatalism and the Politics of Pregnancy.](#)” The *Leftist Cooks* offer a counterargument to biologically unfettered thinking, specifically to Benatarian antinatalism. Whether you find their case convincing, I think, depends on whether you place the demands of life above the moral dualism of right-and-wrong or harm-and-benefit analysis that informs Benatar’s argument. The *Leftist Cooks* reject the idea that we can definitively separate joy from suffering, or pain from pleasure. We are so constructed as humans that we cannot *live* within those

7. As major rule-based, universalist, moral theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism urge.

8. We are crippled animals. No longer content with the moment. Anticipation intrudes on its bliss. As in e. e. cummings’ poem “[it may not always be so](#)” or Bruno Miranda’s [musical setting](#) of it. See our forthcoming piece on *The Epic of Gilgamesh*.

dichotomies. The keyword is “live,” the verb. Life is an imperative... If the Cooks are saying that whenever the demands of life and truth have clashed, life has nearly always won, they are right. That we are here at all is proof... At least heretofore, this has been the case. But will it always be the case? If they are making a normative claim, that life *should* win, they are begging the question: assuming the very thing they seek to prove or at least move us accept. Again, they are right that life has never needed objectivity, truth, logic, critical reasoning, etc. to justify itself. But this is a description, not a prescription. The business of justification has no biological basis. The demand for it is the byproduct of an evolved reflective consciousness. *Self-deception is healthy*, the *Leftist Cooks* say explicitly, if it serves the interests of life. But should the pursuit of life, and everything conducive to it, trump every other conceivable value to those who can conceive such? To many, the answer seems obvious: *of course*... But there seems to be a growing number of us who don’t see it so. There seems to be some disagreement. Why might this be?

Resources

1. “[White House Assesses Ways to Persuade Women to Have More Children](#),” Caroline Kitchener, *The New York Times*.
2. “[The Vanishing of Youth: The precipitous decline of birthrates throughout the world poses a serious threat to humanity. What is to be done?](#)” Victor Kumar, *Aeon*, May 2025. Depopulation is a threat to progressives as well. “Every major advance in human history – technological, cultural, moral – has been driven by youth.” Old people get set in their ways, become risk-averse. If you have any kind of hope for enlightened human progress, it should be placed in the young. Fewer of these means what...?

Image from [Aporia](#) (2023) film. Thanks to Mike and Olivia for some of these references

Appendix: identity and non-identity

...and the moral difference it makes (from our 2019 writeup on “[Existential Risk and AI Governance](#)”)

On identity and discernibility – why this is important

Because when we talk about things happening or not happening to *us*, whether as an individual or as a species, whether in the past or in the future, we need to be clear what it means to declare a thing at one time to be the *same* thing as at another time. In what sense, is it true that I am the same person today as I was yesterday or will be tomorrow? Clarifying identity is an ancient philosophical problem. Perduring, that is, continuing to exist through one period of time and into another, is not as simple as you may think. There are different kinds of identity over time. Some may matter to us more than others. Which and why?

Logical identity

In the context of species survival, what kind of *thing* do we imagine ourselves to be as a species? A thing that will last forever? Or, a finite thing *with an end* as it is still with each individual among us?

And quite apart from that existential question (or conceit) is the *normative* question: given that it may be *logically*—whether physically or not—*possible* for us to last as long as the universe that contains us, *ought* we to last that long? If it is possible, *should* we try?

Or is it not even conceptually possible? If it is not conceptually possible, then the moral question is moot: it disappears. *It disappears because we have no idea what sense to give the notion that we might exist indefinitely.* We know not of such things.

The logical relations involved here are *identity* and *similarity*. Identity is all-or-nothing. Similarity admits of degrees. It is important to specify which of these two concepts is relevant because the logic of each is quite distinct.

Am I the same (as in *logically* identical) person now as I was when I was ten years old? No, already to say I “was” implies I *am* no longer, which entails I am, at least in that regard, different. I cannot be both logically identical with and distinct from something. I am not identical with the ten year-old because we are *discernible*. Discernibility is the possibility that an assertion true of one thing is *not* true of another. It is true the person at ten *then* is not ten *now*. It is not true of the *now*-person “me” that I am ten.

There remains the relation of similarity. Certainly, there are resemblances between me and the ten year-old. Sometimes resemblance or similarity is adequate for alternative, non-logical, forms of identity, such as psychological, socio/cultural/legal, moral, etc. Sometimes not. Exactly when similarity is adequate for these senses of identity and when not is unclear. They are intrinsically ambiguous in a way pure logical identity is not. In fact, the ambiguity is itself a part of the identity of these concepts. Not so with logical⁹ identity. But maybe we don’t care about logical identity. Maybe we can set it aside as unimportant... Maybe we usually do.

Psychological identity

Ordinarily, I take myself to be *psychological* identical with the person I was yesterday if the person I am today can remember himself in existence yesterday and even remember the person *then* anticipating the person I am today. Still, but probably a little less firmly, this was true of the “me” one year ago. Even less a decade or more ago. When I was ten? I want to say, at least, a little, but honestly, it is far less clear what this means even to myself. My “self” is progressively *less* connected with more distant and less vivid events in my life—both those past (in memory) and those yet to occur (in imagination/anticipation).

9. Aka, “numerical” identity. See SEP on [Identity](#).

Socio/cultural/legal identity

Family, of course, those who knew me then and know me now would say, yes, I am identical now with the person we agree *is* me in a childhood photo. I have the same citizenship status as that kid had. The same legal name. I have the same home town, birthday, etc.

But even if any or all of these things were different or uncertain it would not necessarily affect my psychological identity.¹⁰ There can be contingent connections between psychological identity and these more “other-involved” identities but not necessary ones. I can accept a photograph of me as an infant is me, but do I psychologically identify with that infant? No.

Moral identity

This least discussed kind of identity but the most relevant one for addressing questions of whether we could fathom what it would mean to perdure indefinitely is the sense of moral identity in which rational agency is centrally implicated. Moral (or agential) identity is tied to a sense of responsibility or mission or duty and whatever it takes as guiding principles. Whether I identify with the author of acts or thoughts attributed to me is relevant to whether I have an identity, a self, or any kind of presence in play. I do not have this “presence” regarding events that occurred before my earliest memories or beyond anticipations I venture to have about the future. About World War II or the Jurassic Period, I can only draw on information or experiences to which others have exposed me (what I have been taught or read) or inferences drawn from these. About the world one hundred years hence or post our extinction, I can only share or participate in speculation.

I do not have a presence in either *that* past or *that* future in which nothing I could think or do could possibly have effect. Or, in either *that* past or *that* future in which nothing exists with which I could empathetically identify. There are limits to empathy. The limits might be transcended, but the more transcended the less *I* can have a *present* empathy for. And if we have in mind a *future* entity, then it appears this would presuppose the possibility of an empathic identity between me now and this entity of some kind. What would anchor, or link, the empathy between me *now* and whatever, it is suggested, is “me” *then*? Hence, *to the extent we can empathize, we have not transcended*. If the purported future “me” is too different from the me I am intimate with now, what can cause me *now* to identify with the “me” *then*? *It then seems if we transcend too much, we cannot empathize*.

And how much is “too much”?

Suppose this future “me” is, by any measure, a “better” me, a new and improved me. My “better angel,” as Stephen Pinker, is inclined to put it. How much “betterness” can I tolerate before I must say that, although the world might be a better place with this future me, *I would not* be present in that world. *That* me is not me. *My* identity has dropped from consideration.

10. It happens, in my particular case, that much of this early information is filled with uncertainty. I have almost no knowledge of my biological father. I grew up knowing as parents only my mother and step-father. My name was legally altered when I was eight. A large dimension of my origin is, to this day, unknown or unclear to me. Am I different from the norm because of this? Psychologically so? In some other significant sense, different?

How different is “too” different? You would have to ask *me!* Look me up. I am in the world in which there is something I identify with. You, the universe, whatever... may stipulate that a me or something or someone significantly *like* me exists in another possible world. Some purpose may be served by that. Maybe a future “me” would be flattered to be a future instance of me now, or find succor in tracing a genealogy to me or something in the history of my doings,¹¹ but this is not a case of moral or agential identity. Do or think as you please, but there is not an ounce of reason for me to take such identity seriously. I can channel Napoleon. I don’t think Napoleon ever cared to imagined this, nor do I think he would have reason to. I think he could have discerned, even then, the difference between anything about him and whatever got into my head.

More generally, “post-human,” means just that: *post-human*, an existential task *not* in our job-description, as it were. Should we worry about “post-humans” or truly “trans-humans”? Maybe. But surely not because “post” or “trans” are suffixed with “-humans.” Something more interesting, more visceral and concrete, needs to be said.

We can say that imagination outstrips the socio/cultural/legal, psychological, and moral forms of identity. We can *imagine* states, events, or entities we cannot identify with. Push the boundaries of similarity that ground these (non-logical) forms of identity and the meaningfulness of identity drops out. (The barest nudge in the direction of difference is sufficient to making logical identity irrelevant.)

We can imagine lots of things that have nothing to do with us. If we bother, despite, it is quintessentially *idle* curiosity: what it would mean for a community of artificial intelligences to supersede us, for example. Outside of a pastime, it would mean nothing to us because we would not have a *presence* in such a community. “Meaning” *there and then* would be about them, not us.¹²

Imagination pushed, in other words, erodes then, ultimately, destroys relevance.¹³ And a failure of imagination? Imagination comes too late for a deer in the head lights.

Presentation notes

1. Intro, welcome, about the phil club.

2. The procedure for this discussion:

- first, your reactions to the documentaries
- which do you find more compelling, and why?

11. Something like this must motivate fascination with family genealogical research.

12. I am assuming common extant understandings of the parameters of empathy. To encompass the possibility of empathic relations with inanimate objects (as in object sexuality or deep ecology) would obviate the boundaries of empathic moral regard discussed here... The inclusion of such more developed or “evolved” ethical orientations might paradoxically sharpen an intuition of moral finitude: i.e., that we may come to feel imperatives to forfeit perdurance: stop creating the conditions for suffering as suggested by some negative utilitarians (David Benatar), or get out of the way of other things more worthy than us to exist, a view of some hyperbolic deontologists (Otto Weininger).

13. This is related to why science fiction is both morally and aesthetically inferior to, say, literary fiction. The best of the latter never sacrifices authenticity for clarity. Science is fundamentally methodological. That is both virtue and vice. Likewise, analytic philosophy sometimes suffers the same liability.

- the *fact* of depopulation, do you believe it?
- The *normative* judgment as to whether, if true, depopulation is a good thing or a bad thing.
- and whichever, why?

3. The *trilemma*: I call it such because there seem to be serious concerns no matter what we do – or don't do: 1. nothing (as antinatalists may suggest), 2. try to reverse depopulation (as pronatalists may entreat), or 3. try for some sustainable equilibrium (as certain quasi-Utopian visionaries propose).

- what happens if the trend continues as demographers seem to think it will?
- *can* we stop it?
- *ought* we to stop it?
- If we can stop it, or reverse it, is that morally defensible given antinatalist arguments as well as certain conceptual problems such as the non-identity problem which places limits on our genuinely empathetic capabilities and the supposed downstream moral strings tied to them.

4. To whom or to what are we *more* morally obligated:

- the prevention of future pain and suffering *on the whole* – as commanded by ethically driven antinatalism, or
- the prevention of more *near term* pain and suffering of people whose temporal proximity to us is *more immediate and humanly pressing*: the elderly 20 or 30 years, hence, and beyond, and/or their younger cohorts who will have to bear the burden of supporting them – as the numbers of elderly balloons and the number of those of working age shrinks... Seeing this as more urgent is enjoined by virtue-driven, less consequentialist, less deontological, ethical theories.

5. Then there is issue of the what future we envision for humankind:

- Is it a static vision of going back to some idyllic past as suggested by Jason Anthony, or the aggressive expansion of the field of human involvement in the universe as suggested by Elon Musk and company...?
- Is it a gradual diminution of the human footprint on the world to the point of extinction as suggested by some antinatalists?
- The process of extinction by depopulation, if it continues, will be accompanied by sclerotic tendencies: a loss of the energy, creativity, and innovation, *across all fields of human endeavor*, that the young have *always* been associated with. Fewer of *them* means less of *those*. Sometimes for worse, but usually for better, old people die. History shows, or *has* shown.
- But is this how it should be anyway?

6. The problem:

It seems we must *cause* one kind of the pain and suffering of some people, the people living now or soon to be living, to prevent the inevitable pain and suffering of another kind of person, the still nonexistent, but whose existence will be necessary to prevent the pain and suffering of the first group.



*Extended writeup for the topic hosted at
[The Philosophy Club](#) in June 2025
Accessible at [Archive.org](#)*

*– Victor Muñoz
Guanajuato / Seattle*